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Abstract: Households’ or individuals’ decision regarding charitable giving may differ by
type of recipient of the gift. In light of the relative paucity of empirical research on the impact
of tax incentives on charitable giving outside Western countries, empirical research on this topic
in South Korea is valuable in order to compare effects across difference tax regimes and in dif-
ferent institutional environments. We use the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS),
whose panel structure helps alleviate the omitted variable bias that has often appeared in pre-
vious literature using cross-sectional data. This study aims to perform a robust estimation of
tax price and income elasticities for charitable contributions in South Korea. First, we use
exogenous changes in tax rates resulting from Korean Tax Reform to construct instrumental
variables (IVs) for the change in the price of giving. Two tests are undertaken to determine
whether the IVs are weak or not: a size-corrected test of a weak IV robust inference for the
linear instrumental variable model with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity recently devised
by Finlay and Magnusson; and the LIML CUE-GMM estimation. We find that our instruments
are not weak. Following Smith and Blundell, and Rivers and Vuong , we then estimate the
random effect (RE) Tobit Model using a control function based on the IVs. Using the procedure
developed by Mundlak, we estimated a fixed effect model from the RE Tobit model. The tax
price and income elasticities from the pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model are found to be significant
and the magnitudes are similar to those from the GMM fixed effect and CUE-GMM models.
To investigate additional features of the conditional distribution of charitable giving in South
Korea, we use the Censored Quantile regression with instrumental variables (CQIV) recently
proposed by Chernozhukov, Fernandex-Val, and Kowalski. These estimates indicate that the
price elasticity of charitable giving is very heterogenous among donors, while income has a quite
uniform and positive effect over the whole range of the giving distribution significantly.
JEL Classifications: H2, H4
Key Words: Tax Reform, South Korea, Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, Charitable
Giving, Pseudo-fixed effect Tobit, Censored Quantile Regression with IVs, Weak Instruments
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1 Introduction and Overview of Models and Findings
The main purpose of this study is to estimate the price and income elasticity of charitable giving
by households. Estimating the price elasticity of giving is of policy significance. As Andreoni
(2006) has noted, when the provision of public goods privately by charities is a substitute for
government provision of such goods, an absolute price elasticity of giving is a type of “gold
standard.” At one extreme, if the price elasticity of giving is zero, allowing tax deductions
for charitable giving has no effect on the amount of giving to charities. In this case, if the
purpose of the tax deduction is to increase the supply of public good(s), the deduction fails to
achieve this objective, and direct government spending is more efficient means of providing the
public goods. As the price elasticity of giving increases in absolute value, however, more of the
foregone tax revenue actually goes to charities in the form of greater giving.1 A price elasticity
of zero implies that the incentive does not have any effect on giving. A larger absolute elasticity
implies that more of the transfer is actually going to charities. Hence, the estimation of the
elasticities has been an important task in policy evaluation.
Although there is an extensive literature on taxes and charitable giving in western coun-
tries, most notably the United States, relatively little related work exists outside of western
countries. Given that country-specific heterogeneity, resulting from difference in social norms
or institutions, influences the charitable giving decision, empirical research on the determinants
of giving in non-western countries is useful addition to our understanding of the role of eco-
nomic incentives in motivating charitable giving.2 (For example, Peloza and Steel (2005) who
include several studies of giving in emerging economies such as Russia and Singapore in their
survey. Note that “the few estimates that are available from these emerging cultures show sig-
nificantly higher elasticity than those found in other western cultures.” A reasonable question is
whether these higher elasticities are due to differences in empirical methods, or perhaps reflect
differences in giving behavior.)
Since the 1998 economic crisis in South Korea, charitable contributions have risen in po-
tential importance as institutions for improving the welfare of society. Simultaneously many
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have also been founded to complement government failures and
market failures. Most NPOs in South Korea, in fact, have suffered from financial difficulties
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due to shortage of voluntary donation. As Table 1 shows, the ratio of individual charitable
giving to GDP in Korea was below 0.5% in 2005 even though it has increased over time.3 The
ratio of charitable giving to the total annual after-tax income has remained low over time as
Table 2 shows. The “culture of giving” in Korea has not yet matured mainly due to the late
Table 1: Yearly Individual Charitable Giving in South Korea
1999 2000 2001 2003 2005
Total Charitable Giving 2.9 4.45 4.67 5.9 7.13
Wage and Salary Worker 0.8 2 2.7 3.2 3.6
Individual Global Income Tax Filer 0.05 0.23 0.28 0.54 0.74
Subtotal 0.85 2.23 2.98 3.74 4.34
Ratio (%) 29.3 50.1 63.8 63.4 60.9
Ratio of Charitable Giving to GDP(%) 0.16 0.37 0.46 0.49 0.50
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
a All are measured in 100 billion Won and percent (%).
b Ratio means Subtotal Giving divided by Total Giving.
advent of civil society relative to the West economies and societies. Moreover, 80% of individ-
ual donations target religious organizations, according to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance,
Korea.4
Table 2: Ratio of Charitable Giving to Household Income in Korea
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total charitable giving
Total household income
1.02% 0.93% 0.89% 0.97%
Source: The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea
Therefore, we first examine indirectly whether a trade-off exists between government subsidy
and charitable giving, and then explore which factors influence household’s contribution and
how much of an effect these factors have on giving based on estimates from various econometric
models. Following Andreoni (1990, 2006), if the tax price of giving negative and significant
(large in absolute value) in South Korea, the revenue foregone from allowing tax deductions for
charitable contributions increases giving, and hence the financial resources of Korean nonprofits.
The data that is used for the empirical analysis is from the Korean Labor and Income Panel
Study (KLIPS), which has information on individuals and households, including the amount
of charitable giving during the year prior to the survey. In addition, the panel structure of
the data helps alleviate the omitted variable bias that often arises in previous literature using
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cross-sectional data.
The basic empirical strategy is to use techniques that result in robust estimation of tax price
and income elasticities for charitable contribution in South Korea. Most previous studies use
the “first-dollar after-tax price of giving” as an exclusion restriction to address the endogeneity
problem. Using the “first-dollar after-tax price of giving” is used as an exclusion restriction in
the fixed effect estimation, however, raises potential problems of multicollinearity.
As an alternative, this study uses information from the Korean Tax Reform to construct
instrumental variables (IVs). It is, however, the case that point estimates from empirical
specifications with weak instruments are biased, and the Wald test can be unreliable (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) suggest a rule of thumb test of weak
identification using F-statistics on exclusion restrictions. However, it is only a rough tool.
To account for any concerns about weak instruments, we make use of additional estimation
approaches take after estimating the basic models: (1) the two stage Least Square (2SLS),
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM), and (2) Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
(LIML) Continuously Updated Estimation (CUE) of GMM-fixed effect models.5 We use the
Finlay and Magnusson’s (2009) size-correct test of weak IV robust inference for the linear
instrumental variable model with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Then, we use CUE-
GMM to estimate the linear IV model and compare the results from these alternative estimators
with other linear fixed effect models, since LIML CUE-GMM estimators are more robust than
other IV estimators when IVs are weak, as noted by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2004).
Both procedures indicate that our instruments are not weak, which increases the confidence
that the estimates do not suffer from a finite-sample bias from weak instruments.
After confirming that our instruments are not weak, we use the instruments to estimate a
random-effect Tobit Model to address the endogeneity problem. However, we cannot simply
substitute fitted values from first stage regression into the model since substituting fitted values
for an endogenous variable is appropriate only in the case of linear models. Instead, we use a
control function following Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988).
2SLS and GMM do not require distributional assumptions, while the Tobit model does.
If the distributional assumptions are satisfied, the Tobit model with a control function may
provide more efficient estimates than those from the 2SLS and GMM. However, the Tobit model
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does not allow one to transform the data to estimate a fixed effect model. By adding group
mean values of time-varying variables into the estimation equation, following Mundlak (1978),
we construct a pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model. Doing so is a means of removing household
unobservable heterogeneity by estimating the random effect model. The tax price elasticity
of giving is significant, and the magnitude is around -0.83, which is similar to those from the
GMM fixed effect and the CUE-GMM models, respectively -0.94 and -0.899. Income elasticities
are also significant in all models, but the sizes of them are very small, around 0.1. (See Table
5 and Table 6 for the estimates.)
To investigate additional features of the conditional distribution of charitable giving in South
Korea, we also estimate a Censored Quantile regression with instrumental variables (CQIV)
proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2009). This method adapts control function to address the
endogeneity problem. These results imply that the price elasticity of charitable giving is very
heterogeneous along donors’ giving distribution, while income has a significantly uniform and
positive effect over the whole range of the giving distribution.
This study consists of 5 sections. The next section 2 and section 3 cover the brief literature
reviews and data respectively. Estimation methods and estimation results are presented in
section 4. In the final section 5, conclusion and policy implications are expressed.
2 Literature Review
In a world in which there are no tax deductions for charitable contributions, the out-of-pocket
cost of giving $1 to charity is $1. If, however, individuals are allowed to take an income tax
deduction for charitable contributions the out-of-pocket cost of giving falls from $1 to $(1− t)
where t is the individual’s marginal tax rate. Many researchers have estimated the relationship
between the after-tax cost of giving, $(1−t) and the amount of giving in order to assess whether
allowing tax deductions on charity is an efficient way of subsidizing the private provision of
public goods by charities. In Korea, there are few studies to date on how the deduction
affects charitable contribution, in contrast to the United States, where there is an extensive
empirical literature on this topic. Studies using U.S. cross-section data have consistently found
relatively large price elasticity and small income elasticity.6 According to Clotfelter (1985), the
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estimated price elasticities of charitable giving vary from -0.04 to -2.5 based on variables, data
sets, and specifications. A consensus was that tax incentives had a strong positive effect on
charitable giving. However, Steinberg (1990) updating this survey of empirical findings presents
the possibility that price elasticity could be less than unity in absolute value when panel data
sets are used. In fact, more recent studies using panel data report significantly lower price
elasticities than those using cross-sectional data.
In order to overcome the drawbacks of cross-sectional data,7 Randolph (1995) uses panel
data to separate the effects on giving of permanent changes in the giver’s after-tax price from
transitory effects. He finds that permanent income effects are much stronger than the transitory
changes, and the temporary price elasticities are much stronger than the permanent price
elasticities. His results imply that individuals will respond more strongly to transitory changes
in price. In contrast, Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002) reach the opposite conclusion that
charitable contributions are more sensitive to the changes in the both permanent price and
income, while they use the expanded version of Randolph’s (1995) data.8 This difference is
caused by the adaptation of a different econometric approach. In any case, it is obvious that
changes in tax policies that change the marginal tax rates of givers can either increase or
decrease the amount of giving, even though magnitude of such changes estimated by Randolph
(1995) and Auten et al. (2002) are different.9 In any case, it is obvious that the tax policies
help either increase or decrease the amount of giving, even though the conclusions given by
Randolph (1995) and Auten et al. (2002) are different.10
Barrett et al. (1997) use the following specification that allows for an estimation of the effects
of habits by including lagged giving as an explanatory variable, time shifting, and consumption
smoothing on the time path of adjustment and estimate the permanent and temporary effects
of tax policy on charitable giving.
ln git = α0 + β1 ln git−1 + β2 ln Iit−1 + β3 lnPit−1 + β4 ln Iit + β5 lnPit + β6 lnPit+1
+β7 ln Iit+1 +Xδ + it, (1)
where git represents contribution of individual i at time t, P represents the price of contribution,
I represents income, and X represents other explanatory variables. The model in equation (1)
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is estimated with a panel of 1,382 individual taxpayers filing itemized returns in the years of
1979-86 from the Statistics of Income (SOI) panel of returns from the Ernst and Young Tax
Research Database. Barrett et al. (1997) find that the long-run price elasticity is -0.47, and the
transitory price elasticity is -1.40. The effects of habits in giving are small.
A consensus about the effect of tax incentives on charitable giving has not been established
yet in the United States. In addition, a smaller number of studies explore the phenomenon in
countries other than the United States, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Russia, and
Singapore (Peloza and Steel, 2005).
Brooks (2002) examines Russian charitable giving using the World Bank’s Household Expen-
diture and Income Data for Transitional Economies (HEIDE). He finds that Russian households
donate an average of 0.6% of their annual after-tax income to charity in 1993. His Full Infor-
mation Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Tobit model finds that income and price elasticity are
respectively 2.78 and -6.68, which are considerably higher than estimates of these parameters
from studies using data from the United States.11
Chua and Wong (1999) investigate the relationship between charitable giving and tax incen-
tive in Singapore, using 1989 tax files obtained from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore.
They estimate income and price elasticities for givers with differing education levels. This study
finds that the income elasticities are positive, but below unity. The price elasticities are in the
range of -3 to -6, which indicates a very strong response of charitable contributions to the tax
price of giving in Singapore.
Wu, Huang, and Kao (2004) use the Survey on Family Income and Expenditure on Taiwan
to estimate peer effects on charitable giving, and income and price elasticities of giving. From
the Tobit model, they find that for metropolitan area the price elasticity of household level
charitable contributions is around -3.3, and for non-metropolitan area it is around -2.2. These
estimates are greater than those of the United States in absolute value.
Research on charitable giving in Korea is limited. After the 1998 economic crisis in South
Korea, encouraging charitable contributions emerged as an issue in improving the welfare of
society due to the deepened economic polarization in Korea; i.e., the rich are getting richer,
while the poor are getting poorer. However, studies on this subject are still at an early stage
because of the scarcity of the data. Park and Park (2004) use the survey of household giving
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from July 3 until July 17 of 2002, which was conducted by Volunteer 21, a non-government
organization in Korea. They found that both income and giving price are not significant
in explaining charitable giving behavior, using the Tobit model and the Heckman’s two-step
estimation.
In addition, Bradley, Holden, and McLelland (2005) raised concerns about the assumptions
of parametric estimation on which much of the emprical literature on charitable giving – in the
U.S. and elsewhere – is based. They find that the maximum likelihood estimation including the
Tobit model produces much higher price elasticities than those from semi-parametric methods.
Their results suggest that the parametric assumptions, especially normality assumption, may
not hold.
In the above-cited studies on giving in emerging economies, researchers estimate price elas-
ticity from cross-sectional or pooled models under the parametric distribution assumptions.
The results from studies using data from the United States suggest that estimates of the price
elasticity are greater when estimated with cross-sections than with panel data. Moreover, the
findings from Bradley et al. (2005) suggest that charitable price elasticity estimated with a Tobit
model is significantly larger than that estimated with semi-parametric models. It is somewhat
of a puzzle that research with Korean data fails to find any significant estimates of income
and price elasticities at any conventional level.12 We use new panel data to estimate the price
and income elasticity with parametric methods. Furthermore, a semi-parametric method (i.e.,
censored quantile regression), is adapted to compensate for some drawbacks of the parametric
methods.
3 Data: Korean Labor and Income Panel Study
Research on charitable giving in Korea as relied on two sources of data: survey data and tax-filer
data. In Korea, the National Tax Service (the Korean IRS) does not yet provide public-data
on tax filers.13 Here, we use the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) from 2004
to 2007. Only during these periods is the information available on household total charitable
donation.14 The KLIPS sample is an equal probability sample of households from the seven
metropolitan cities and urban areas in eight provinces (excluding Cheju Ireland), and is designed
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to yield 5000 households and their members (aged 15 and over) interviewed. There are largely
two types of KLIPS data sets: the household data set derived from the Household Question-
naire and the individual data set compiled from the Individual Questionnaire administered on
the household members aged over 15. The household data set includes demographics, changes
in household members, family relations, and financial resource exchange between generations,
type of accommodation, children’s education and child care; household income and consump-
tion including charity, assets, and debts; financial status; and consumption requirements that
put pressure on household finance. The individual data set includes a wide array of categories
such as the person’s state of economic activity; income-earning activities and consumption;
education and vocational training; employment characteristics, work hours, job-seeking activi-
ties; professional and life satisfaction; and labor market mobility. In addition, both after- and
before-tax wages and salaries of the husband and wife are reported by the respondents. We
only use the households that have information on before-tax information.15
The KLIPS includes a specific question on the amount of charitable giving. Only 24% of
total households record positive pure charitable giving. In the estimation, to avoid the problem
creating by having a logarithm of zero, we take a logarithm of the reported amount of giving
plus 1.16
Tax price of giving indicates indirectly how much the donor bears the cost of monetary
giving. Peloza and Steel (2005) shows how previous studies treat this variable as one of the
most important determinants affecting charitable giving. Given the tax deduction, the tax-price
of giving is computed by “1-the marginal tax rate” conventionally.
In addition, the marginal tax rates are computed by the information on before-tax wage
and salary, after-tax wage and salary, number of kids, and tax schedules for the relevant year
to compute.17 In the case that both the husband and wife receive wage or salary income, we
use the primary earner’s tax price of giving as the tax price of giving for the household.18
The survey that we use does not include the information on individuals’ itemizing status.19
Moreover, Table 3 shows that a high proportion of non-tax payers exists in the earned income
tax. About 45% of employees do not pay any income tax. In our data, about 40% of households
do not pay any income tax.20 Considering the tax credit given to low-income groups, we note
that about 69% of the households including the non-tax payers are located below the marginal
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tax rate of 0.06. (See Appendix Table A-14 for details.)
Table 3: Proportion of Taxpayers in Korea
Year (in thousand persons) 2003 2005 2007
Number of employee taxpayers1 11,547 11,903 13,376
Non-taxpayers under tax threshold2 5,457 5,796 5,631
Taxpayers1 6,090 6,107 7,745
Ratio of taxpayer 52.7% 51.3% 57.9%
Source: Statistical Yearbook of National Tax, National Tax Service, Korea
aUnits are 1,000 persons.
bFor example, the tax threshold is 15.8 million Won for the household with 4 members
including 2 kids under 20 years old in 2006.
The estimations were based on household panel data from surveys conducted over the period
of 2004-2007. All money values were adjusted with the base year 2005, using the consumption
price index. All descriptive statistics are Table A-1 in the Appendix. In the fixed effect model,
we use 13,613 observations since we remove the households that only appear for a single year.21
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that women are more generous than men in cases in
which it is relatively expensive to give. Given that female-headed households are more likely to
have less income than their counterparts in South Korea, it is natural that contributions from
a female-headed household is less than those from a male-headed household in terms of the
absolute amount. If female-headed households demonstrate the characteristics of male-headed
Table 4: Giving by Gender
Average of Real Giving per year
Gender of Head Full sample Sub-sample (charity>0) Household Income
Female Headed 20.19 89.70 2619.57
Male Headed 36.73 150.54 4591.58
Total 34.61 143.28 4356.38
Source: KLIPS 2004-2007
aUnits are 10 thousand Won.(1,000 won ' $1)
households, the prediction may be changed. These results may imply which gender is more
generous on average. From the prediction of regression, we find that female-headed households
are more generous on average. The detailed discussion can be found in section 4.2.1.
Table A-2, A-3, and A-4 in the Appendix show the transition matrix of changes in contrib-
utors’ giving behavior between two time periods. According to each table, non-donors during
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the current year are more likely to act as non-donors during the following year; i.e., about 88%
of non-donors do not give any contribution during the next period. However, if donors ever
experience giving, they tend to contribute the next time as well. Moreover, the proportions
increase over time: 58% (2003 to 2004), 66% (2004 to 2005), and 69% (2005 to 2006). The main
reason for the increment is the decrease in the proportion of ever-donors to non-donors during
the next period: 41.7% (2003 to 2004), 34% (2004 to 2005), and 30% (2005 to 2006). Non-
donors have a strong tendency to remain in the status of non-donors. It seems to be important
that policymakers note this point and provide more incentives for non-donors to venture out of
it. The high proportion of non-donors can be interpreted as an immature culture of donation.
However, this high proportion of non-donors may rather present an opportunity for NPOs in
South Korea, because the financial health of the NPOs would be strengthened if non-donors
participated in giving.
The average contribution dropped a bit in 2004 in full sample of Table A-1. This reduction
may be due to the economic recession in 2003 in South Korea.22 However, the amount of
charitable giving has kept increasing in the sub-sample of Table A-1. This phenomenon may
imply that the polarization of charitable giving appears in Korea.
4 Estimation Models and Results
4.1 Identification Strategy
An issue that any empirical study of charitable giving needs to address is that of potential
reciprocal causation between the marginal tax rate at which charitable deductions are taken
and the amount of charitable deductions. For taxpayers itemizing their deductions, their taxable
income decreases simultaneously as their charitable giving increases, and their corresponding
marginal tax rate can change if they fall into lower tax brackets. Therefore, the marginal tax
rate could be a function of charitable giving, and thus the least square (LS) estimates of the
tax effects on charitable giving may be biased. In fact, there is not much difference between the
last-dollar and the first-dollar price of giving in Korea due to the small amount of charitable
giving per household and a large tax bracket.23 Accordingly, deductible charitable giving may
not change households’ marginal tax rate. That is, deductible charitable giving probably will
10
not reduce the tax base enough to make the applicable marginal tax rate drop to a lower rate.
If there is no endogeneity problem, the estimation is much simpler. Hence, we test whether
the endogeneity problem exists with various methods.24 We detect the existence of edogeneity
problem.
Past and future prices of giving can be good candidates of instrumental variables in order to
identify tax effect. However, considering that current giving may be related to past and future
tax prices of giving as well as that charitable giving may be serially correlated across time, past
and future tax prices of giving are not appropriate. Hence, the most common procedure used
in this context was to use “first-dollar giving price” as the instrumental variable. Since the
“first-dollar tax rate” was the tax price on the first dollar of charitable giving, the “first-dollar”
tax rate was uncorrelated with charitable giving. The first dollar tax price of giving is a good
instrument in identifying the price elasticity, but it often causes collinearity problem in fixed
effect estimation.25
Following Bakija (2000), we use the tax reform information in Korea to generate exclusion
restrictions, since the tax reform is an exogenous shock that generate the changes in tax price of
giving. We first construct an excluded variable which is strongly correlated with the mixture of
transitory and permanent tax prices, lnPt(M it), and then we construct another instrumental
variable that is correlated with permanent variation in tax price, lnPs(M is). We use the
difference between them as an instrument variable for the transitory tax prices to identify
the elasticity of charitable giving. In the estimation, excluded variables include all interaction
terms with explanatory variables.26 These variables are actually based on the first dollar price
of giving so that they don’t violate the exclusion restriction. Hansen’s J statistic is used to
test the exogeneity of the instruments. In addition, we test whether the exclusion restriction
is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable in the linear fixed effect model setting. The
conditional likelihood test (CLR), proposed by Moreira (2003), can be applied only under i.i.d.
assumption. Recently Finlay and Magnusson (2009) propose tests for weak-instrument robust
inference for a general class of instrumental variables models. The results are reported in Table
A-15 in the Appendix. The instruments pass all the tests. The detailed explanation is covered
within section 4.2.1.
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4.2 Parametric Estimation
4.2.1 Linear Fixed Effect Models with IVs
Since many taxpayers have no charitable deductions, many studies of charitable giving have
used the Tobit model to estimate the effect of tax incentive on charity.27 We estimate the linear
random and fixed effect model using instrumental variables with full samples in order to compare
their estimates to the correspondence of pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model. All specifications have
the time dummies. The time dummies remove the time series variation in the average of tax
rates across the full sample from the identifying variation.
In the random effect model, the household-specific effects remove differences in tax rates
across households that are constant across time from the identifying variation. The first column
in Table 5 represents the results relying on a two-stage least-squares random-effects estimator
under the assumption of Cov(Xit, ui) = 0. We treat the ui as random variables that are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the panels. Standard errors are computed
by the panel bootstrap with 200 replications. In section 3, we assert that giving behaviors of
male- and female-headed households may differ on average. To test this assertion, adjusted
predictions of giving by gender is computed from the specification (1) and (2). Here we only
report the results from (1): 1.491, which would be the expected value of ln charitable giving
if everyone in the data were treated as if they were female. 0.975 would be the expected
value of ln charitable giving if everyone were treated as if they were male. The female-headed
households seem to make more charitable donations than the counterparts. Decomposition of
the each of those numbers allows us to test whether female-headed households donate more
than the male-headed.28 We have four cases: 1a. the logarithm of average charitable giving
from treating females as females is 0.912; 1b. treating males as females 1.573; 2a. the expected
value of ln charitable giving from treating females as males is 0.396; and 2b. treating males as
males 1.057. It would be interesting to test the equality of 2b and 1b, to determine whether
the expected value of ln charitable giving for males treated as males is equal to that for males
treated as females. The test performed on the model would be a test of whether the charitable
giving differs between male-headed households and female headed, when they have the same
attributes. The hypothesis that two numbers of logarithm of average charitable giving are
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equal is rejected at any conventional level (χ21 = 49.10, p-value= 0.000). Hence, female-headed
households significantly donate more than male headed if the female-headed households have
the same values of attributes that the male-headed households have.29
Column (2) in Table 5 shows the two stage least square fixed effect estimates under the
independently identically distributed error assumption. Column (3) and (4) in Table 5 rep-
resent the estimates from GMM estimation of the fixed-effect model with heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation robust variance covariance matrix. Column (5) in Table 5 reports limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) continuously updated GMM estimates proposed by
Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996). Hahn et al. (2004) point out that LIML estimators are
more robust than other IV estimators when the instruments are weak.
Instrumental variable methods rely on two assumptions: the excluded instruments are dis-
tributed independently of the error process, and they are sufficiently correlated with the included
endogenous regressors. From all the fixed effect models in Table 5, the Sargan-Hansen test (a
test of overidentifying restrictions) is performed. The joint null hypothesis is that the instru-
ments are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. The second specification of column (2) in Table 5 under
i.i.d. rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level. The Sargan test statistic, however, is only
valid under i.i.d. assumption. Since we detect the heteroscedasticity in this specification, it
is not reliable.30 Instead, we use Hansen’s J-statistic, which is known as robust against het-
eroscedasticity. We fail to reject the null hypothesis even at the 20% level in all other fixed-effect
models except the second model having heteroscedasticity. (p-values of Hansen’s J statistic are
0.28, 0.23, and 0.24 respectively for columns (3), (4), and (5).) In addition, we test the null
hypothesis that the reduced form coefficients are underidentified by Wald version of Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rank statistic.31 The underidentification test determines whether the excluded
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. From the fixed-effect model (3), (4),
and (5) in Table 5, the null hypothesis is rejected at any conventional level.
Estimates from instrumental variable models will not be reliable when excluded instruments
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors.32 According to Stock et al. (2002),
the rule of thumb test for weak identification is to see if F -statistic on the excluded instruments
of the first stage regression is greater than 10 when one endogenous variable exists. Although
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Table 5: Omniscient Estimation with IVs: 2SLS, GMM, CUE-GMM
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable RE G2SLS FE w/IID Preferred
ln Giving w/Boot error 2SLS GMM GMM CUE GMM
ln Giving price -1.112*** -1.171*** -0.919*** -0.940** -0.899**
(0.409) (0.283) (0.319) (0.367) (0.366)
ln Income 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.0285) (0.0246) (0.0258) (0.0301) (0.0301)
Schooling Year 0.0887*** 0.0425 0.0437 0.0411 0.0415
(0.00931) (0.0386) (0.0439) (0.0523) (0.0522)
Head Age 0.0453*** 0.0184 0.0179 0.0190 0.0192
(0.0153) (0.0379) (0.0348) (0.0422) (0.0420)
Age squared -0.000186 -0.000274 -0.000258 -0.000267 -0.000268
(0.000154) (0.000378) (0.000356) (0.000436) (0.000435)
Gender of Head -0.516*** -0.541** -0.505*** -0.489** -0.487**
(male=1) (0.0737) (0.216) (0.177) (0.207) (0.207)
Marital status 0.291*** 0.181* 0.193** 0.195* 0.197*
(married=1) (0.0674) (0.104) (0.0950) (0.116) (0.115)
Family Size 0.0408 0.0271 0.0300 0.0283 0.0283
(0.0254) (0.0319) (0.0315) (0.0386) (0.0385)
ln Financial Asset 0.0173*** 0.0174*** 0.0181*** 0.0178*** 0.0178***
(0.00501) (0.00417) (0.00442) (0.00522) (0.00522)
House owned (=1) 0.0212 0.107** 0.103** 0.106* 0.105*
(0.0414) (0.0455) (0.0474) (0.0575) (0.0575)
2004 -0.127*** -0.0874*** -0.0904*** -0.0910*** -0.0907***
(0.0313) (0.0316) (0.0309) (0.0352) (0.0350)
2005 -0.113*** -0.0361 -0.0376 -0.0381 -0.0384
(0.0321) (0.0433) (0.0398) (0.0449) (0.0444)
2006 -0.0842** 0.0244 0.0208 0.0223 0.0218
(0.0363) (0.0580) (0.0516) (0.0568) (0.0560)
Constant -2.872*** -2.55e-10 -0.00168 -5.35e-11 -4.13e-11
(0.423) (0.00899) (0.00897) (1.07e-09) (1.06e-09)
σu 1.383
σe 1.242
N 13613 13613 13613 13613 13613
log likelihood -19961.4 -19953.0 -19953.7 -19952.5
aStandard errors in parentheses
b* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
cColumn (1) uses random effect panel model with generalized 2SLS. Standard errors are computed by 200
replications of bootstrap.
dColumn (2) uses fixed effect panel model with 2SLS under i.i.d. assumption.
eColumn (3), (4), and (5) uses GMM fixed effect panel model.
fColumn (3) and (4) uses robust and clustering variance-covariance matrix.
gColumn (5) uses GMM CUE fixed effect panel model with HAC robust covariance matrix.
hThe Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) are reviewed
in the Appendix B.1.
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F -statistics are greater than 10 from all specifications, this high F value does not always imply
that the instrument is not weakly correlated. The rule of thumb is, however, only a rough tool
to determine whether the instruments are weak.
To account for any concerns about weak instruments, we take the following steps after
estimating various models.33 (i.e., the 2SLS, GMM, and CUE-GMM fixed-effect models) First,
we use Finlay and Magnusson’s (2009) size-correct test of weak IV robust inference for the linear
instrumental variable model with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The test results are
shown in Table A-15 in the Appendix. In order to implement this, we re-estimate the column
(2) specification in Table 5 by 2 Stage Least Square (2SLS) with the cluster-robust standard
error, because heteroscedasticity was detected previously.34 Table A-15 reports Moreira’s (2002)
conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test statistic, the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test, the J
statistic,35 and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.36 The Anderson and Rubin (1949) test
and the CLR test determine the significance of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the
endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero and whether the
overidentifying restrictions are also valid, which is robust to weak instruments simultaneously.
The Wald test is not robust against weak instruments. The confidence set from the Wald test is
a little bigger, and is in fact almost similar to those from other robust statistics, which indicates
that our instrumental variables are not weak.37 Hence, the coefficient of endogenous variable,
the price elasticity of giving, is significant. Second, we use Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) CUE-GMM to estimate the linear IV model and compare the estimates
with those from other linear fixed effect models, since LIML CUE-GMM estimators are more
robust than other IV estimators when IVs are weak, as Hahn et al. (2004) point out. The LIML
CUE-GMM standard error of the endogenous variable is almost similar to that of other models.
Hence both results suggest that our instrumental variables are not weak and that finite sample
bias arising from weak instruments is unlikely to be a problem.
Finally, we test the endogeneity of the endogenous regressor (i.e., giving price) by the Wu-
Hausman F -test version of the endogeneity test. The test rejects the null hypothesis that the
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous at 1% level. The estimated equation, hence,
has an endogeneity problem, while the exclusion restrictions resolve the problem.
From the various specifications, we prefer the fixed-effect GMM model with heteroscedas-
15
ticity and autocorrelation robust variance-covariance matrix in the fourth column of Table 5.
Most coefficients in the random effect model in the first column of Table 5 are statistically
significant. Unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. generosity or dignity), however, may be correlated
with household heads’ education level, age, and house ownership. If the correlations exist, the
random effect model is not consistent while the fixed effect model is consistent.38 The second
specification (2) in Table 5 is estimated by the fixed effect model under i.i.d. assumption. We
test the null hypothesis that the disturbance is homoscedastic by the Pagan and Hall (1983)
heteroscedasticity test after the fixed-effect IV estimation.39 We reject the null hypothesis of
the homoscedasticity in 1% significance level. The fifth column of Table 5 reports the limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) continuously updated GMM estimates proposed by
Hansen et al. (1996). Hahn et al. (2004) point outs that LIML estimators are more robust than
other IV estimators when the instruments are weak.40 Given that the instrumental variables
pass the weak instrument robust test as well as that giving behaviors in the current year are
correlated with those in the last year, we prefer the specification (4) in Table 5.
Based on specification (4), price and income elasticities are statistically significant at the
5% level, while all the specifications report that price elasticities of giving are statistically
significant at that level. Since we fail to reject the null hypothesis that price elasticity of giving
is equal to -1 at any conventional level, we can conclude that allowing charitable donations to
be deducted provides some incentive to increase charitable giving in South Korea. The income
elasticity of giving is significant, but its magnitude is reported around 0.11. The magnitude of
income elasticity is somewhat smaller than those of the previous studies such as Brooks (2002)
and Chang (2005). This may be good news for NPOs in South Korea, since it would imply that
the severe income recession may not does not badly adversely affect the finances of NPOs. This
is consistent to the descriptive statistics in Table A-1: for the sub-sample of the households
that giving is greater than zero, the mean value of amount of donation keeps increasing through
the 2004 recession over all data periods, while the average amount of donation for all sample
decreased during the 2004 recession. In other words, income growth may not generate a large
impact on the donation to NPOs.
Interestingly, age and education are not significant in the preferred fixed-effect model (4) in
Table 5 as well as all other fixed-effect models. If the effect of age and education can be taken
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as proxies for the effect of permanent income, we may say that charitable contribution in South
Korea does not depend on permanent income. Other factors held constant, the change in gender
of household head, (i.e., from female-headed to male-headed households), decreases contribution
by about 40%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.41 If a single household head gets
married, with other conditions unchanged, the contribution increases by about 20.8%, which
is marginally significant. A 10% increase in financial assets significantly increases about 0.2%
in contributions at any conventional level. The amount of financial assets significantly affects
the decision of participation, but it is unlikely to affect severely the decision regarding the
amount of giving. The status of house ownership is marginally significant when a household
decides to participate in giving. When a household owns its house, the contribution goes up by
about 11%. Comparing the specifications (3) and (5) with (4) in Table 5 as a robustness check
method, the sizes of price and income elasticities are almost similar. In addition, there is no
loss of significance for all the explanatory variables across all the specifications.
4.2.2 Pseudo-Fixed Effect Tobit Model with Control Function
Since the amount of charitable giving is continuous over strictly positive values but it takes on
zero with positive probability, using a linear model for the charitable giving does not necessarily
pose problems. However, negative fitted values could be obtained and then it leads to negative
prediction for the charitable giving. In addition, the assumption that an explanatory variable
appearing in level form has a constant partial effect on conditional expectation of giving is not
consistent with such data. To obtain more plausible partial effects we therefore estimate the
pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model using Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2005) GLLAMM.42
The pseudo-fixed effect model includes group mean values of time varying explanatory variables
(Mundlak, 1978).43 By doing so, we can remove unobservable heterogeneity within the random
effect estimation.
Let us compose Xit = (xit1, zit), where zit can be an exclusion restriction of the price, ln pit.
The linear reduced form for the price of charitable giving, ln pit, is represented by the following:
ln pit = ψ +Xitδ2 + X¯iα2 + vit2, t = 1, .., T (2)
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Since the price pit is a continuous endogenous explanatory variable, the above equation can be
estimated by regressing pit on the time dummies, all exogenous variables, and group means to
get the residuals, vˆit2. These residuals are included in the pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model along
with time dummies, ln pit, xit, and X¯i.
ln g∗it = α1 ln pit + x
′
it1β + X¯
′
it1ξ1 + ρvˆit2 + εit (3)
ln git = max(0, ln g
∗
it) (4)
εi|(Xi, vit2) ∼iid N [0, σ2ε ] (5)
This control function approach is adapted following Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and
Vuong (1988) under the assumption that the endogenous variable, the price of charity, has a
linear reduced form with additive normal error independent of the exogenous variables.44 The
general idea of the control function approach is to model endogeneity as an omitted variable.
Since the last dollar price of giving is a continuous endogenous explanatory variable, we can
combine the pseudo-fixed effect Tobit model with the control function approach. Since we use
the two-step procedure, the standard errors in the second stage should be adjusted for the first
stage estimation.45
The Tobit model relies on normality and homoscedasticity in the underlying latent variable
model. If normality assumptions in equation (5) fail, the estimates may not be consistent. One
informal way to evaluate whether the Tobit model is appropriate is to compare the estimates
from the Tobit with estimates from a probit model.46 We fail to find certain problematic signs
comparing both the estimates of Table A-17 and Table A-18.47 Hence, we estimate the pseudo-
fixed effect Tobit model under the assumption that individual specific effect and idiosyncratic
error are independently identically normally distributed.
Table 6 shows the estimated results. The unconditional marginal effects from the pseudo-
fixed effect Tobit specification are similar to coefficients estimated in the fixed effect model
produces. We detect endogeneity problem, since the coefficient of the control function is signifi-
cant at any conventional level.48 The estimation results go with those in linear panel models in
Table 5. Roughly comparing Table 6 with the Table 5, all coefficients in Table 6 have the same
sign as the corresponding estimates in Table 5, and the statistical significance of the estimates
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Table 6: Pseudo-Fixed Effect Tobit Model
Dependent Variable Coefficient S.E. Unconditional S.E. Conditional S.E.
ln Total Giving Marginal Effect Marginal Effect
ln Giving Price -3.350*** (1.284) -0.830*** (0.319) -0.806*** (0.309)
ln Income 0.512*** (0.126) 0.127*** (0.031) 0.123*** (0.030)
Schooling year 0.180 (0.178) 0.045 (0.044) 0.043 (0.043)
Head Age 0.154 (0.185) 0.038 (0.046) 0.037 (0.044)
Age squared -0.002 (0.002) 0-.00045 (0.0005) -.00044 (0.0004)
Gender of Head (male=1) -2.830** (1.120) -0.884** (0.427) -0.765** (0.339)
Marital status (married=1) 1.200** (0.582) 0.275** (0.123) 0.278** (0.130)
Family Size 0.119 (0.150) 0.029 (0.037) 0.029 (0.036)
ln Financial Asset 0.068*** (0.020) 0.017*** (0.005) 0.016*** (0.005)
House owned (=1) 0.354* (0.213) 0.087* (0.052) 0.085* (0.051)
2004 -0.461*** (0.148) -0.111*** (0.035) -0.11*** (0.035)
2005 -0.330* (0.200) -0.080* (0.048) -0.079* (0.047)
2006 -0.048 (0.268) -0.012 (0.066) -0.012 (0.064)
Control function 5.347*** (1.633) 1.325*** (0.406) 1.287*** (0.393)
Constant -20.818*** (2.027)
Group Means
Mean price -3.428 (2.985) -0.850 (0.739) -0.825 (0.718)
Mean income 0.291 (0.237) 0.072 (0.059) 0.070 (0.057)
Mean schooling year 0.107 (0.181) 0.027 (0.045) 0.026 (0.043)
Mean Age 0.047 (0.197) 0.012 (0.049) 0.011 (0.047)
Mean Age squared 0.001 (0.002) 0.00024 (0.0005) 0.00023 (0.0005)
Mean Gender 0.196 (1.188) 0.048 (0.294) 0.047 (0.286)
Mean Marital status 0.850 (0.702) 0.211 (0.174) 0.205 (0.169)
Mean family size -0.006 (0.187) -0.001 (0.046) -0.001 (0.045)
Mean financial Asset -0.018 (0.046) -0.005 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011)
Mean house owned -0.619* (0.325) -0.153* (0.081) -0.149* (0.078)
σu 4.711*** (0.113)
σe 3.210*** (0.052)
N 13613
log likelihood -13288.068
aRobust standard errors in parentheses
b* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
cStandard errors of partial effects are computed by Delta-method.
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is similar.
The GMM fixed effect model (4) in Table 5 and pseudo-fixed effect model with the Mundlak
(1978) approach in Table 6 agree with each other. The schooling years of household head and
the age of head are not significant at any conventional level. In addition, the magnitudes of
unconditional marginal effects are very similar to each other.49 We find that we have endo-
geneity problem, since the coefficient of control function is significant at any conventional level.
Price and income elasticities in Table 5 and Table 6 are significant, and the sizes are similar.
Here, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the price elasticity is equal to -1 at any
conventional level. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the tax incentives are not effective in
raising the amount of donations made to NPOs in South Korea.50
4.3 Censored Quantile Regression with IVs
Since the estimation of the effect of tax incentive on charitable giving focuses on the various
effects on the conditional mean of charitable giving, the size and nature of these effects were not
represented on the lower tail of the charitable giving distribution.51 Applying censored quantile
regression to the corner solution case allows one to account for more features of the conditional
distribution of charitable giving in the estimation.52
Literature on the quantile regression models using panel dataset has been small but growing
(Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008; Canay, 2008; Honore, 1992; Koenker, 2004; Rosen, 2009)). The
difference between an equation (10) and a panel quantile model is the existence of the unobserved
ci. If ci were observable and the parameter of interest is β(τ),
Yit = X
′
itβ(Uit) + ci, P (Yit ≤ X ′itβ(τ) + ci|Xi, ci) = τ, (6)
where t=1,...,T , and i=1,...,n under the assumption that Uit ∼ U [0, 1]|Xi, ci and the function
τ → X ′β(τ) is assumed to be strictly increasing in τ ∈ (0, 1). However, the random variable ci
is not observable and could be correlated with other random variables, which hinders consistent
estimation of the model.53 The literature on the mixture of censored panel data and quantile
regression is much rarer.54 Hence, we don’t use the quantile fixed effect model. Instead, we use
censored quantile regression with instrumental variables (CQIV) for cross-sectional data, since
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quantile regression itself can account for the unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous effect
in a cross-sectional setting.
Chernozhukov, Fernandex-Val, and Kowalski (2009) demonstrate a simple way of estimating
censored quantile regression with instrumental variables (CQIV) for cross-sectional data. They
adapt the Iterative Linear Programming Algorithm (ILPA) proposed by Chernozhukov and
Hong (2002) and the control function approach to handle endogeneity. However, Fitzenberger
(1997) points out that ILPA is not guaranteed to converge and convergence does not even
guarantee a local minimum of the CQR problem. Here, we adapt the resampling strategy
introduced by Bilias et al. (2000) for censored quantile regression and the control function
approach under the mean independence assumption between the tax price variable and the new
error term having the control function.55
The censored quantile instrumental variable model is formalized as
ln g = max(ln g∗, 0) = T ((ln gi)∗) (7)
(ln g)∗ = Q(ln g)∗(U |P,X, V ) (8)
P = φ(V,X,Z), (9)
where ln g is the logarithm of observed year-end charitable giving, and T (x) ≡ max(x, 0) is the
transformation function that censors the unobserved uncensored value of (ln gi)
∗ at 0, where 0
is lower limit for censoring following Chernozhukov et al. (2009). P is the last dollar marginal
tax price of giving, and X are covariates described in the previous section except education
level of household head,56 Z is the instrumental variables, V is a latent unobserved regressor
working as control functions, and U satisfies the assumption that U ∼ U(0, 1)|P,X, 0, V . The
functional form allows for random coefficients that vary with the percentiles of the charitable
giving distribution:
(ln g)∗ = α(τ) +X ′β(τ) + γ(τ)V
The control term, Vˆ is estimated by predicting the OLS residuals from the first stage equa-
tion. The 90% confidence intervals on the coefficients are obtained by bootstrapping with 500
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replications.
The estimates are only from the 2004 cross-sectional data. We choose 2004 data because we
believe that the variation of charitable giving during this year is larger than in other years, since
household income decreased due to the 2004 recession and giving price from the 2005 tax reform
expected an increase.57 Roughly 23% of the households give charitable contributions greater
than zero. Many unobserved charitable giving and little price variation hinders obtaining precise
estimates below the 0.77 quantile of the charitable giving distribution. Although estimates can
be obtained below the 0.77 quantile, the values are not reliable. Hence, we only report the 0.77
quantile and above.
In the cross-sectional model, we use the first dollar price of giving as an instrument variable
following the tradition of this research area because the tax reform information cannot be
applied to the cross-sectional data. Figure A-3 in the Appendix A.6 presents a summary of
censored quantile regression results. The solid line with dots represents the point estimates
βˆj(τ) : j = 1, ..., 14 with the dotted lines depicting a 90% pointwise confidence band. The
significance of the variables is similar to that of the random effect model.
In the first panel of the figure A-3 in the Appendix A.6, the intercept of the model may be
interpreted as the estimated conditional quantile function of the charitable giving distribution
of female-headed with no-house ownership having a head with less than a high school education.
The price elasticity is significant at the lower and middle tail, but it is insignificant at the higher
tail. At the lower tail, the donors are very sensitive to the price changes. Given income and
other variables, the households with a high level of giving at the right tail are insensitive to
price. Low tax awareness makes the estimated tax price elasticities insignificant or small in
absolute value. Schokkaert (2006) points out that the differences in tax awareness are related
to underlying motivations of giving.58 If crowding-out occurs in the large donors’ side, they
may be dutiful altruists. For example, religious giving represents about 80% of total giving in
South Korea, according to the Korean government. In that case, tax price of giving may not
be significant.59
Income has a significantly uniform and positive effect over the whole range of the distribu-
tion, and the magnitude is small. A large increase in income may not cause a large increase in
contributions across all distribution of giving. The effect of university education differs across
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the conditional distribution. As household heads’ education increases, the percentage increase
in charitable giving increases over the whole range of the conditional distribution. Except in
the household with a very high level of charitable giving, female-headed households give less
charitable contributions than male-headed. Households with very high contributions are not
sensitive to the change in the gender of household head. Households with very high contribu-
tions do not respond to the age of household head, but across other conditional distribution,
an increase in the age of household head significantly increases charitable giving. Households
with a moderate level of contribution increase giving, with a decreasing rate with an increase
in age. Married status among heads significantly positively affects the percentage of change in
charitable giving across all ranges of the distribution except the right tail. Generally speaking,
we find that households’ charitable giving decisions are affected by the different factors across
the distribution of charitable giving. Households with large amount of giving are not affected
by price, head sex, head age, and marital status in South Korea. When policymakers set up
policies about tax and charitable giving, they should note that the behaviors of big-contributors
are different from those of small-donors.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study analyzes the household’s determinants of charitable giving and effect of tax incentive
on charitable giving in South Korea. We find that the charitable giving in South Korea is
determined by household income, tax price of giving, gender of household head, marital status
of head, amount of financial asset, and house ownership from the pseudo-fixed effect estimation.
Household heads’ education and age do not affect whether the households choose to donate.
All specifications report that the price elasticity of giving is significant, although its esti-
mated size is not 1 in absolute value. The estimated price elasticities are similar or somewhat
smaller than those based on the data from the United States or other Western countries. The
income effect on giving is also significant, but the magnitude is very small. Although per capita
GDP increases over time, the ratio of giving to GDP in Korea may not be expected to increase.
Hence, tax incentive is a more important tool to boost up the charitable contribution in South
Korea.
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The maturity of civil society can be measured by how well nonprofit sectors complement the
functions that are the primary responsibility of the government.60 Since the late 1990s, many
NPOs, including public-serving nonprofit and voluntary and grassroots associations, have been
founded in South Korea, but they have suffered from financial difficulties. To alleviate their
financial difficulties, Korean government implemented an Act for Nonprofit Organization Aid in
2000, through which the government directly provides financial support to NPOs. The govern-
ment’s direct financial support requires responsibility; for example, obeying the management
standard and procedure imposed by the government. Hence, the direct financial support may
affect organizational autonomy, financial autonomy, and program autonomy. In addition, the
government can only choose and support the NPOs that are favored by the government.61
Therefore, the best way to support NPOs is to increase voluntary donation.
Given the low participation rate of charitable giving in South Korea, the increase of the
ratio is required. From all the various specifications in this study, the tax price of giving is
a significant determinant when households decide whether to take part in donation or not.
Considering that ever-donors, in addition, are likely to take part in giving repeatedly in the
future62 (See Appendix A.2 Transition matrix), the expansion of tax deductibility has the
potential to increase the participation rate. Naturally, a culture of giving will be also fostered.
Therefore, the expansion of tax deductibility or tax credit is an effective method to support
NPOs without hurting the NPOs’ autonomy as well as to foster the culture of donation.63 The
tax deduction helps provide the financial resources that NPOs need to provide collective public
goods. Furthermore, it can help facilitate the creation of new NPOs’ particularly in the early
stage of a civil society like South Korea.64
Notes
1According to Vesterlund (2006, p.581), “necessary for a unit elastic demand to be the threshold for efficiency
is also that individuals truly make the contributions they report on the tax form, and that the government is
able to make a direct transfer without adversely affecting the contributions by others.” Therefore, considering
that religious organizations do not receive government expenditures as a substitute for private contribution, the
concepts of “treasury efficient” or “golden rule” may not be rigorously applicable to analysis of our data because
our data does not allow classification of the aim of charitable giving.
2Cordes (2001) points out that the uncertainties about the price sensitivity of giving will disappear as data
improve. But he argues that consideration of charitable giving will require more than estimates of price elasticity.
List (2007) also points out that institutions are important in the decision of charitable giving.
3According to Giving USA 2008, the ratio of individuals’ charitable giving to GDP was about 1.7% in the
2000s’ in the United States.
4The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) does not have information about the aims of donation.
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5These models can work as a good reference for the Tobit model as if a linear probability model is a good
reference for a probit model.
6A cross-sectional data set only allows us to examine the relationship between current price and income and
current charitable giving. Using the cross-sectional data, the omitted variable bias appears, for example, the
expected future price of giving. Bakija (2000) points out that, if the current price is different from the expected
future price, and if people are willing to respond by changing the timing of their giving, then estimates that
involve only the current price would be biased to estimate the permanent price elasticity.
7Barrett, Mcguirk, and Steinberg (1997) summarize the advantages of using panel data set in this topic:
First, sufficient information of panel data set allows us to control for a variety of unobserved but confounding
influences. Second, panel data set that spans statutory tax changes helps us account for the independent effect
of price and income on giving. Third, timing and other dynamic effects can be estimated within panel setting.
8The permanent price elasticity exceeds the absolute value of 1.
9Auten et al. (2002) directly estimated the variance and covariance matrix of income and prices by explicitly
modeling the dynamic process determining prices and incomes.
10It is due to the statistical assumptions to identify the permanent response from the transitory response in
the data.
11He argues that high price elasticity may be due to the measurement error on deductible contribution or
income. He also maintains that certain parts of the population are more likely to file tax returns than others.
12Park and Park (2004) mentioned Park, Park, and Jeong (2002), one of their previous studies on the same
topic. Park et al. (2002) also fail to find significant estimates of income and price elasticities in Korea.
13Tax-filer data might be more accurate than survey data because variables, such as income, age, donation,
itemizing status, and so on, are taken from income tax returns.
14Peloza and Steel (2005) take Clotfelter’s (1985) argument about speculation of using survey data; elasticities
derived from survey data may be artificially high.
15The limitation of our data is that all workers are treated as wage and salary workers. Hence, the profit of
self-employed workers or business owners is not included in this study, since large measurement error can occur
through the inclusion of the profit or loss.
16As a robustness check, we estimate censored quantile regression models censored at contribution of 5 again.
We fail to find any loss of significance.
17While NBER’s TAXSIM can be used for research on the United States, it cannot be used for Korean data.
Moreover, there is no standardized version of any computing programs for marginal tax rates of South Korea.
Therefore, marginal tax rates for each year are computed by the author using the given information. Appendix
A.4 presents how to compute the marginal tax rates.
18The tax report is based on the individual unit. Hence, the joint report does not necessarily give benefit
to filers in South Korea. In the case that a household has many dependents, it is more beneficial to report
separately; for example, the household head gets deduction from the number of dependents and the wife also
gets a deduction using the other dependents that are not included in the household head’s tax report.
19Korean tax system does not classify the itemizers.
20The difference in the numbers is due to KLIPS only including information from urban areas. For the most
part, income in urban areas is greater than that of rural areas.
21Cook’s distance, standardized residuals, studentized residuals, and DFBETA are used to detect bad influen-
tial observations. The detected observations are removed, leaving us with 14,266 observations.
22Real GDP growth rate in Korea decreased from 7.2% in 2002 to 2.8% in 2003. The number of donors also
decreased from 900 in 2003 to 790 in 2004.
23The last dollar-price of giving is defined as “1-the marginal tax rate after all deductions,” while the first
dollar price of giving is defined as “1-the marginal tax rate evaluated at zero dollars giving”
24We test whether the endogeneity problem exists by the control function approach in both the pseudo-fixed
effect Tobit and censored quantile model with IV as well as by Wu-Hausman F-test in all fixed effect models.
25We also have the same problem in the fixed effect estimation. The collinearity arises from the property of
the marginal tax rate: marginal tax rate is a non-linear function of income, and the function is largely the same
for everyone during a given year. In addition, the first dollar price may itself be correlated with the unobserved
determinants of contributions if the unobserved determinants of giving (for example, generosity or dignity) are
correlated with other deductions or income sources.
26Methods to construct these variables are given in Bakija (2000, pp. 17-20). He constructs lnPs(M is), the log
price function based on the known year s tax schedules, evaluated at an “averaged” measure of taxable income
M is. M is is based on four-year individual averages of before-tax income and deductions other than charity,
adjusted for known features of the year s definition of taxable income. The instrument constructed for transitory
variation in price is lnPt(M it) − lnPs(M is), the difference between year t and year s marginal tax rates due
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entirely to legislated changes in the tax schedules. Here t represents current year and s represents next year
when currently enacted tax law is fully phased-in.
27We treat charitable giving as a consumption good following the same track of the previous empirical research.
Andreoni (1990) and Andreoni (2006) propose “warm-glow” theory, in which individuals get some utility from
consuming charitable contributions. Following the tradition, the demand for charitable giving by donors can
be explained by utility maximization. The optimal amount of giving can be determined within the utility
maximization. In addition, the effect of income tax on giving can be analyzed within this framework, and the
optimal consumption level of charity is determined subject to tax-price of giving and total income. A utility
maximization problem for charitable giving may be represented by Ui(x, g) = x+ ai ln(1 + g), where x is annual
consumption and g is annual charitable giving. The variable ai determines the marginal utility of giving for
household i.
max Ui(x, g) = x+ ai ln(1 + g)
s.t. Ii = xi + pigi
x ≥ 0, g ≥ 0,
where Ii is household income and pi is the tax price of charitable giving. Hence, a corner solution, gi = 0 exists
if ai ≤ pi by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
28The following test is different from the overall significant test of head-gender variable.
29However, we cannot conclude that female-headed households are more generous than male headed over the
whole range of a contribution distribution since the test performed above is only evaluated at the conditional
mean. The detailed study is for another project.
30Pagan and Hall (1983) heteroscedasticity test is performed after the fixed-effect IV estimation. We reject
the null hypothesis of the homoscedasticity in 1% level.
31The traditional test of the rank of a matrix for the standard (stationary) case is the Anderson canonical
correlations test (Anderson, 1951). But this version of the test is not robust to heteroscedasticity.
32As Angrist and Pischke (2009, chap.4) summarize, point estimates with weak instruments are biased, and
naturally Wald test is unreliable.
33These models can work as a good reference for the Tobit model as if a linear probability model is a good
reference for the probit model.
34 Moreira (2002) discusses alternative test statistics that are also robust for weak instruments. After “within-
transformation” of data, we use the Stata command ”condivreg” to estimate coverage-corrected confidence sets
and p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of endogenous variable is not significant under i.i.d. Both
the conditional likelihood ratio test and the Lagrange Multiplier test reject the null hypothesis at any conventional
level. 95% confidence sets are reported as [−1.717302,−.6335934] and [−1.717556,−.6333413], respectively, and
both sets do not include 0. This test does not support robust standard error.
35It tests only the overidentification restrictions evaluated at the null hypothesis. It differs from Hansen’s J
statistic.
36It only tests whether the structural parameters are significant.
37In case of weak instruments with intracluster-dependent errors, the confidence set from the Wald test is
far greater than those from other robust statistics. In the Table A-15 in the Appendix, we also find that our
exclusion restrictions are not weak.
38The Hausman test can determine the existence of the correlation. The null hypothesis is marginally rejected
that the estimates from the random effect model are consistent. (χ2(12)=19.20 and p-value=0.083)
39The fixed IV estimation procedure is as follows: the “within transformation” is first applied to the data,
(i.e., all variables have group means subtracted), and then an IV estimation is performed on the demeaned data.
40LIML is less precise than 2SLS but also less biased.
41Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the interpretation of the coefficients of dummy variables when
the dependent variable is log-transformed is given in: 100(exp(b−V (b)/2)− 1), where b is a coefficient and V (b)
is a variance of b.
42Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles’ (2005) GLLAMM allows us to use adaptive quadrature method, while
Stata’s command “xttobit” only has the fixed quadrature method. If the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component is large, the fixed quadrature approximation can become less
accurate.
43Estimating the fixed effect model for the censored panel data is practically and theoretically difficult in the
Tobit model setting. Since git in (4) is observed only after transformations, difference-estimation and within-
estimation are impossible. Large N and fixed T require many dummy variables di so that it is practically
impossible to estimate the fixed effect model. Moreover, theoretically, the incidental parameter problem can
appear as the number of parameter increases with N and fixed T .
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44This method, (i.e., the control function approach) has a few advantages against plugging the fitted values.
The addition of predicted residuals of the reduced form into the random effect model can solve the endogenous
problem regardless of how the endogenous variable appears. Plugging fitted values for the endogenous variable
only works in the case in which the model is linear in the endogenous variables. In addition, the control function
approach makes it much easier to test the null hypothesis of endogeneity of the variable as well as compute
average partial effects.
45Alternatively, the panel bootstrap can be used to compute standard errors, even though it consumes too
much computing time.
46Table A-18 in the Appendix shows the estimates of the random effect probit and the pseudo-fixed effect
probit models. The standard errors are computed by the panel bootstrap with 200 replications.
47Both Tables have the standard errors from 200 replications of bootstrap.
48Robust standard errors of coefficients are included. All standard errors are adjusted for the first stage
regression.
49Unconditional marginal effect can be compared to the coefficients in Table 5. The unconditional marginal
effects in Table 6 are computed by multiplying the adjustment factor with the Tobit estimates: ∂E(g|x)
∂xj
=
βjΦ(xβ/σ). Evaluated at the sample mean values of the explanatory variables, the factor Φ(x¯βˆ/σˆ) is about
0.248, which is a consistent estimate of probability of giving > 0 conditional on the explanatory variables
Pr(g > 0|x). In addition, the conditional partial effects for the sub-sample of households with charity>0 can be
computed by the factor, 0.2407.
50As a robustness check, we estimate the same specification using Stata’s command “xttobit” with 200 repli-
cations of bootstrap to compute standard errors. Bootstrap standard errors are known as robust against het-
eroskedasticity. We draw pairwise plots of the standardized residuals and each regressor. The control function
and the standardized residual plot show that the control function may be a candidate causing heteroscedasticity.
Also, estimates of censored quantile regression imply that the control function may cause heteroscedasticity. In
addition, we detect the existence of heteroscedasticity in the fixed effect model (2) of Table 5.
51We have estimated models with a corner solution, because charitable contribution has a mass point at
zero. The Tobit model generates a few features of conditional distribution of charitable contribution given the
explanatory variables, such as Pr(g|g > 0, X), E(g|g > 0, X), and E(g|X).
52Since Powell (1986) introduced censored quantile regressions (CQRs), one can estimate quantiles of the
conditional distribution.
min
βˆ(τ)
n∑
i=1
ρτ (ln gi − T (X
′
iβ(τ))), (10)
where ρτ (u) = {(1− τ)I(u < 0) + τI(u > 0)}|u|. It allows √n-consistent estimates of β without assuming a par-
ticular distribution for the error term and without even assuming that the error and covariates are independent.
53 Rosen (2009) shows that a conditional quantile restriction alone does not identify β(τ). If the equation (6)
is represented as
Yit = X
′
itβ(τ) + ci + eit, P (eit(τ) ≤ 0|Xi) = τ, (11)
where eit ≡ X ′it[β(Uit)−β(τ)], the conditional quantile restriction Qeit(τ |Xi) = 0 does not have enough identifi-
cation power since eit is not identical across t. Canay (2008) argues that Abrevaya and Dahl’s (2008) method of
obtaining an estimator of β(τ) could be problematic based on Rosen’s (2009) proof. Abrevaya and Dahl (2008)
use the correlated random-effect model with the Chamberlain (1982) approach, which views the unobservable
individual heterogeneity as a linear projection onto the observables plus a disturbance.
54Honore (1992) uses an assumption that errors are conditionally independent and identically distributed.
Showing that assumption implies symmetry of the distribution of observed outcomes, he consistently estimates
the parameters of the censored model. However, this is not applicable in the heavily censored case, because
Honore’s (1992) estimation is a version of censored least absolute deviation (CLAD); i.e., median regression.
Due to the fact that our data is heavy censored, we use cross-sectional model instead of Honore (1992).
55The advantages of CQIV are summarized by Kowalski (2009): first, the CQIV allows the coefficients to vary
with the quantile of interest; second, CQIV allows for endogeneity and handles censoring nonparametrically.
One of disadvantages of quantile regression is attenuation bias caused by censoring, which also occurs in the
parametric mean regression.
56Household head’s education year dummies are generated into four categories: university graduates, some
college education, high school, and under high school
57Time adjustment effect for donors may be expected, i.e., people can donate more to avoid a future high price
of giving after tax reform. To confirm that our estimates are not affected by the time adjustment effect, we
estimate the marginal distribution functions of contribution during 2003 and 2004, controlling for the relevant
explanatory variables following Machado and Mata (2005). The difference between them is not significant over
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the whole range of giving distribution. The 95% confidence bands for the differences are computed by 1000
replications of bootstrap. Hence, there is no evidence of time adjustment effect in South Korea from 2003 to
2004. (See Appendix Figure A-1.)
58Schokkaert (2006) summarizes the motivations of giving: material self-interest, social prestige, reciprocity,
dutiful altruism, social pressure, pure altruism, and empathy.
59Eckel and Grossman (2004, p.273) argue that the extremely religious households could not respond to price
change, while income elasticity could be equal to 1 in the extreme case.
60A role of the nonprofit sector is to complement the market failure and government failure. Brinkerhoff,
Smith, and Teegen (2007) summarize the complementary roles of the third sector: providing services; advocating
policy process; demanding an appropriate mix of public goods from governments and donors; intermediating
among local communities, other civil society actors, governments, donors, and private sectors; and building the
capacity of community groups to interface with government and private sector actors.
61The conflict between the government and NPOs makes social benefits smaller than they might be under
more cooperative arrangements (Brinkerhoff et al., 2007, chap. 3). On the other hand, the government’s direct
support may be beneficial to NPOs; it may establish credibility of NPOs by recognition. The credibility acquired
by the government’s support helps NPOs to garner more donations.
62Sociological work suggests the existence of “the memory” effect, such as learning by doing or developing a
role identity (Piliavin and Charng, 1990).
63France allows tax credit for charitable giving instead of tax deductibility.
64Fortunately, the Korean government plans to extend the tax deductibility of giving in the 2010 Tax Reform.
This reform increases the tax deductible cap up to 20% of the taxable income from the current 10%.
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Appendix A
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Sub Sample: Charity>0
Mean SD Mean SD
Charitable Giving 35.05 131.2 144.41 234.82
2003 33.46 (N=3,201) 114.87 129.03 (N=830) 196.43
2004 31.77 (N=3,412) 103.76 139.31 (N=778) 179.62
2005 34.16 (N=3,612) 122.06 147.22 (N=838) 218.21
2006 40.82 (N=3,388) 173.02 161.16 (N=858) 314.48
Last-dollar price 0.93 0.09 144.41 0.09
Total Household income 3624.6 3485.22 0.91 3732.31
Head education year 12 3.7 4358.18 3.78
Head Age 46.23 11.57 12.66 11.05
Head Sex(Male=1) 0.88 0.33 47.83 0.32
Marital Status(marry=1) 0.8 0.4 0.89 0.34
Number of Family Member 3.32 1.24 0.87 1.16
Financial asset(log) 4.58 3.47 3.51 3.43
House owned(=1) 0.59 0.49 5.07 0.48
N 13,613 3,304
Source: The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea.
aAll values are adjusted to 2005 values using Korean Consumer Price Index.
bSD stands for standard deviation.
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A.2 Transition Matrix of Giving Behaviors
Table A-2: Transition of Giving Behaviors 2003 to 2004
Giving 2004
Giving 2003 0 1 Total
0 1,957 261 2,218
(88.23) (11.77) (100.00)
1 322 451 773
(41.66) (58.34) (100.00)
Total 2,279 712 2,991
(76.20) (23.80) (100.00)
Source: KLIPS 2004-2007
aThe ratio (%) in parentheses from year to year.
b1 represents that households contribute. Otherwise, 0.
Table A-3: Transition of Giving Behaviors 2004 to 2005
Giving 2005
Giving 2004 0 1 Total
0 2,169 274 2,443
(88.78) (11.22) (100.00)
1 244 474 718
(33.98) (66.02) (100.00)
Total 2,413 748 3,161
(76.34) (23.66) (100.00)
Source: KLIPS 2004-2007
aThe ratio (%) in parentheses from year to year.
b1 represents that households contribute. Otherwise, 0.
Table A-4: Transition of Giving Behaviors 2005 to 2006
Giving 2006
Giving 2005 0 1 Total
0 2,200 297 2,497
(88.11) (11.89) (100.00)
1 237 528 765
(30.98) (69.02) (100.00)
Total 2,437 825 3,262
(74.71) (25.29) (100.00)
Source: KLIPS 2004-2007
aThe ratio (%) in parentheses from year to year.
b1 represents that households contribute. Otherwise, 0.
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A.3 Tax Schedule Change
Recently Korean government has decreased the income tax rate by 1% over gross income hi-
erarchies since January 1, 2005. Based on the tax schedule, the tax-price of giving can be
computed. In addition, the ceiling for the earned income tax credits is raised to 55% of as-
sessed tax liabilities from the previous 45% in 2004–but 50 % was applied only in 2003. Due to
the wage and salary income tax credit, the marginal tax rate of low income earners is reduced.
We include tax credit computing the marginal tax rates.
Table A-6 represents the amount of charitable Giving in Korea over income distribution. As
income increases, the amount of charitable giving increases over all years. In 2004, there was
a recession in Korea. That recession may affect households located within the lowest income
quantile, considering participants only between 2003 and 2004. From the full sample, we find
the reduction of charitable giving in other income quantiles. This suggests that a recession
could hinder households from participating in charitable giving.
Tax rate change generates tax price of giving since tax price of giving is defined as “1-
marginal tax rate” in this paper. We expect that decreases in the income tax rate by 1% over
all yhr gross income hierarchies increase tax price of giving over all income hierarchies; 1.087%,
1.205%, 1.351%, and 1.538% for each income hierarchy, respectively. Table A-7 provides change
of charitable giving just before and after policy change. Price changes, based on tax reform,
could affect the amount of charitable giving decision in Korea heterogeneously depending on
which income quantiles households are located in: Households within the lowest income group
reduce charitable giving by about 10%, while households with high income (4th and 5th quan-
tiles) slightly reduce or increase the charitable giving. (Due to the small number of participants,
the t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the amount of charitable giving before and after
policy change is the same.)
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Table A-5: Income Tax Schedule in Korea
Taxable annual income Taxable annual income Tax Rate
(in won) (in dollar) (2002-2004) (2005-2007)
less than 10m less than $9,891 9 % 8 %
10m-40m $9,891-$39,565 18 % 17 %
40m-80m $39,565-$79130 27 % 26 %
more than 80m more than $79,130 36 % 35 %
aThe dollar figures are computed by the 2005 exchange rate of $1=1011 won.
Table A-6: Charitable Giving in Korea over Income Distribution
Full Sample
Year Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5
[1020.68] [2087.09] [2948.48] [4119.14] [7948.25]
2003 12.810 15.741 28.184 44.437 72.880
2004 10.580 19.583 23.207 43.748 67.856
2005 9.1725 18.109 24.184 35.848 80.517
2006 10.516 14.743 25.366 45.925 93.507
Total 10.755 17.124 25.251 42.425 79.698
Sub Sample: Giving>0
2003 68.057 74.274 107.531 146.858 209.716
2004 63.822 109.240 117.793 152.764 204.875
2005 57.876 103.838 112.285 151.668 219.539
2006 61.080 82.589 110.500 168.316 247.218
Total 62.959 92.339 111.622 155.274 222.729
Source: The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea.
aAll values are adjusted to 2005 values using Korean Consumer Price Index.
bAverage income of each quantile is in square brackets.
Table A-7: Change of Giving Before and After Policy Change (Giving>0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Pre-Policy Change Post-Policy Change Percentage t-statistics
Quantile 2004 2005 Change H0:(1)=(2)
1 63.822 57.876 -10.274(%) 0.6155
2 109.24 103.838 -5.202(%) 0.3476
3 117.793 112.285 -4.905(%) 0.4005
4 152.764 151.668 -0.723(%) 0.0596
5 204.875 219.539 6.679(%) -0.5504
Population 139.312 147.222 5.373(%) -0.7922
N 778 838
Source: The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea.
aAll values are adjusted to 2005 values using Korean Consumer Price Index.
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A.4 Marginal Tax Rate
Table A-8: Wage and Salary Tax Credit 2003
tax amount 2003 tax base
tax≤ 500,000 tax × 0.5 5,555,600
500,000<tax≤1,166,666 250,000+(tax-500,000) × 0.3 11,481,478
Table A-9: Wage and Salary Tax Credit 2004
tax amount 2004 tax base
tax≤500,000 tax×0.55 5,555,600
500,000<tax≤ 1,250,000 275,000+(tax-500,000)×0.3 11,944,444
Table A-10: Wage and Salary Tax Credit 2005-2008
tax amount 2005-2008 tax base
tax≤500,000 tax×0.55 6,250,000
500,000<tax≤1,250,000 275,000+(tax-500,000)×0.3 12,647,059
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Table A-11: Marginal Tax Rate and Giving Price 2003
2003 tax base (G) marginal tax rate Giving Price
G≤10 million .09× .50 =.045 1-(.09×.5) =.955
10 million<G≤11.481 million .18×0.30 = 0.054 1-(.18×.3) = .946
11.481 million<G≤40 million .18 1-.18 =.82
40 million <G≤80 million .27 1-.27 = .73
80 million<G .36 1-.36 = .64
Table A-12: Marginal Tax Rate and Giving Price 2004
2004 tax base (G) marginal tax rate Giving Price
G≤10 million .09× 0.55 = 0.0495 1-(.09× .55) = .951
10 million < G≤11.944 million .18×0.3 = 0.054 1-(.18 ×.30) = .946
11.944 million< G ≤ 40 million .18 1-.18 =.82
40 million<G≤80 million .27 1-.27 = .73
80 million<G .36 1-.36 = .64
Table A-13: Marginal Tax Rate and Giving Price 2005-2008
2005-2008 Tax Base (G) Marginal Tax Rate Giving Price
G≤10 million .08×0.5= 0.04 1-(.08×0.55) =0.956
10 million<G≤12.647 million .17×0.3 = 0.051 1-(.17×0.3) =0.949
12.647 million<G≤40 million .17 1-.17 = .83
40 million<G≤80 million .26 1-.26 = .74
80 million<G .35 1-.35 = .65
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Table A-14: Marginal Tax Rate in Korea
Year
Marginal Tax Rate Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 Total
0 1,358 1,284 1,368 1,213 5,223
.044 0 0 883 792 1,675
.045 773 0 0 0 773
.0495 0 892 0 0 892
.051 0 0 242 205 447
.054 120 185 0 0 305
.17 0 0 930 938 1,868
.18 825 906 0 0 1,731
.26 0 0 156 196 352
.27 104 122 0 0 226
.35 0 0 33 44 77
.36 21 23 0 0 44
Total 3,201 3,412 3,612 3,388 13,613
Sources: KLIPS each year and Income Tax Schedule in Korea
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A.5 Regression Results Tables
Table A-15: Weak Instrument Robust Tests and Confidence Sets for Linear IV with Cluster VCE
H0: β[ln tax price]= 0.
Test Statistic Value P-value 95 % Confidence Set
CLR stat(.)= 9.14 0.0025 [-1.70192, -.28692]
AR χ2(12) = 23.09 0.0270 [-1.84192, -.14692]
LM χ2(1) = 7.55 0.0060 [-1.70192, -.28692]
J χ2(11) = 15.54 0.1590
LM-J H0 rejected at 5 % level [-1.73692, -.25192]
Wald χ2(1) = 6.58 0.0103 [-1.65877,-.221803]
aWald test is not robust to weak instruments. The confidence set from Wald
test with weak instrument is likely to be much larger than that from other ro-
bust statistics in the linear IV model with intracluster-dependent errors based
on Monte Carlo simulation by Finlay and Magnusson (2009).
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Table A-16: Estimation with IVs using Sub-sample (Charity > 0)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RE FE w/IID FE w/H FE w/HAC FE w/weak IV
ln Giving G2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM CUE
ln Giving Price -0.862** -1.252*** -1.139** -1.161** -1.183**
(0.436) (0.439) (0.481) (0.469) (0.469)
ln Income 0.224*** 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.168***
(0.0393) (0.0437) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0513)
Schooling Year 0.0621*** -0.0266 -0.0228 -0.0218 -0.0206
(0.00847) (0.0579) (0.0609) (0.0526) (0.0532)
Head Age 0.0197 0.0567 0.0519 0.0469 0.0470
(0.0174) (0.0632) (0.0548) (0.0583) (0.0582)
Age squared -0.000108 -0.000240 -0.000183 -0.000134 -0.000133
(0.000176) (0.000609) (0.000601) (0.000641) (0.000639)
Gender of Head -0.255** 0.00922 -0.0340 -0.0438 -0.0542
(male=1) (0.107) (0.432) (0.336) (0.337) (0.340)
Marital Status 0.171* -0.0593 -0.0834 -0.0870 -0.0773
(Married=1) (0.104) (0.279) (0.185) (0.202) (0.203)
Family Size 0.0426* 0.0169 0.0190 0.0249 0.0240
(0.0234) (0.0451) (0.0490) (0.0548) (0.0546)
ln Financial Asset 0.00575 0.0116* 0.0122* 0.0126* 0.0127*
(0.00515) (0.00632) (0.00679) (0.00705) (0.00706)
House owned (=1) 0.0205 0.162** 0.150** 0.141** 0.137**
(0.0441) (0.0651) (0.0677) (0.0692) (0.0689)
2004 0.0519 0.0190 0.0233 0.0276 0.0267
(0.0353) (0.0487) (0.0391) (0.0386) (0.0384)
2005 0.0905** 0.0381 0.0298 0.0268 0.0255
(0.0353) (0.0722) (0.0420) (0.0426) (0.0421)
2006 0.0646* 0.00203 -0.00192 -0.00110 -0.00167
(0.0360) (0.0995) (0.0471) (0.0480) (0.0471)
constant 0.590
(0.507)
N 3304 2618 2618 2618 2618
log likelihood -1948.0 -1945.5 -1946.2 -1946.8
aStandard errors in parentheses
b∗ p <.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A-17: Robustness Check: Pseudo-Fixed Effect Tobit Model with Bootstrap
Dependent Variable Coefficient S.E. Unconditional S.E. Conditional S.E.
ln Giving Marginal Effect Marginal Effect
ln Giving Price -3.349** (1.411) -0.832 (0.319) -0.807 (0.338)
ln Income 0.512*** (0.130) 0.127 (0.031) 0.123 (0.031)
Schooling year 0.180 (0.198) 0.045 (0.044) 0.043 (0.048)
Head Age 0.154 (0.205) 0.038 (0.046) 0.037 (0.049)
Age squared -0.002 (0.002) -0.0005 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0005)
Gender of Head (male=1) -2.829** (1.132) -0.884 (0.427) -0.765 (0.344)
Marital status (married=1) 1.200* (0.714) 0.275 (0.123) 0.278 (0.160)
Family Size 0.119 (0.157) 0.029 (0.037) 0.029 (0.038)
ln Financial Asset 0.068*** (0.022) 0.017 (0.005) 0.016 (0.005)
House owned (=1) 0.354 (0.234) 0.087 (0.052) 0.085 (0.056)
2004 -0.460*** (0.157) -0.111 (0.035) -0.110 (0.037)
2005 -0.329 (0.228) -0.08 (0.048) -0.079 (0.054)
2006 -0.048 (0.311) -0.012 (0.066) -0.012 (0.075)
Control function 5.365*** (1.763) 1.332 (0.406) 1.292 (0.423)
Constant -20.755*** (2.156)
Group Means
Mean price -3.389 (3.078) -0.842 (0.739) -0.816 (0.741)
Mean income 0.290 (0.244) 0.072 (0.059) 0.070 (0.059)
Mean Schooling year 0.106 (0.200) 0.026 (0.045) 0.026 (0.048)
Mean Age 0.045 (0.213) 0.011 (0.049) 0.011 (0.051)
Mean Age squared 0.001 (0.002) 0.0002 (0.0005) 0.0002 (0.0005)
Mean Gender 0.213 (1.179) 0.053 (0.294) 0.051 (0.284)
Mean Marital status 0.832 (0.783) 0.207 (0.174) 0.200 (0.188)
Mean family size -0.006 (0.182) -0.001 (0.046) -0.001 (0.044)
Mean financial Asset -0.018 (0.044) -0.005 (0.011) -0.004 (0.010)
Mean house owned -0.618* (0.356) -0.154 (0.081) -0.149 (0.086)
σu 4.738*** (0.061)
σe 3.203*** (0.013)
N 13613
log likelihood -13286.614
aBootstrap standard errors are in parentheses
b* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
cStandard errors of partial effects are computed by Delta-method.
dStata command “xttobit” is used. Table 6 is estimated by GLLAMM.
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Table A-18: Random Effect and Pseudo-Fixed Effect Probit
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
ln Giving Random Effect Probit Pseudo-Fixed Effect Probit
ln Giving Price -1.099** (0.447) -0.955** (0.487)
ln Income 0.176*** (0.0452) 0.160*** (0.0493)
Head Education 0.0915*** (0.0114) 0.0687 (0.0711)
Head Age 0.0651*** (0.0207) 0.0653 (0.0818)
Age squared -0.000311 (0.000208) -0.000774 (0.000756)
Gender of Head -0.821*** (0.109) -0.960** (0.436)
Marital Status 0.557*** (0.107) 0.358 (0.227)
Family Size 0.0424 (0.0287) 0.0508 (0.0613)
ln Financial Asset 0.0227*** (0.00643) 0.0234*** (0.00724)
House owned (=1) 0.0224 (0.0576) 0.112 (0.0820)
2004 -0.228*** (0.0483) -0.185*** (0.0526)
2005 -0.225*** (0.0495) -0.141 (0.0831)
2006 -0.164*** (0.0493) -0.0367 (0.112)
Control term 1.617*** (0.580) 1.490** (0.604)
Group Means
Mean price -1.189 (1.017)
Mean income 0.0687 (0.0843)
Mean Schooling year 0.0211 (0.0714)
Mean Age 0.000209 (0.0851)
Mean Age squared 0.000484 (0.000770)
Mean Gender 0.120 (0.452)
Mean Marital status 0.299 (0.260)
Mean family size -0.0202 (0.0722)
Mean financial Asset -0.00329 (0.0162)
Mean house owned -0.189 (0.121)
Constant -6.045*** (0.559) -6.517*** (0.710)
lnσ2u 0.837 0.064 0.839 (0.058)
N 13613 13613
log likelihood -5989.8739 -5984.3207
aStandard errors in parentheses are computed by bootstrap with 200 replications.
b* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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A.6 Figures
Figure A-1: Difference of Marginal Distribution: 2003 and 2004 (Giving>0)
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Figure A-2: Cumulative Distribution of Giving: 2003 and 2004
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Figure A-3: Censored Quantile Regression for Giving
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Appendix B
B.1 Review of 2SLS and GMM Estimation Methods for Panel Data
We can define various GMM estimators depending on how to define the weighting matrix. For
detailed explanation and references see Hayashi (2000) and Wooldridge (2002).
B.1.1 Fixed Effect IV Estimation
Suppose that the following equation is estimated.
yit = x
′
itβ + eit, (12)
where eit = ci + vit, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and t = 1, 2, ..., T . ci represents individual specific unob-
servable effects, vit is idiosyncratic errors, following IID(0, σ
2
v). If E(xitci) 6= 0, and then we
have to adapt the fixed effect estimation method such as difference, demeaning, or dummies,
since Least Square (LS) method including the random effect estimation is inconsistent. But
if E(xitvit) 6= 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T is a potential problem, we have to consider another estimation
method.
Assume that we find an instrument zit that satisfies the contemporaneous exogeneity as-
sumption, E(zitvit) = 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T . A stronger assumption is that weak exogeneity,
E(zitvit) = 0, s ≤ t, t = 1, ..., T .1
In our estimation setting, we find that the random effect estimates may not be consistent.
Hence, we adapt the differenced estimation method as a fixed effect estimation method, which
remove the ci’s, in order to get consistent estimates.
y˜it = x˜
′
itβ + v˜it, (13)
where y˜it = yit − yit−1, x˜it = x1it − x1it−1, and v˜it = eit − eit−1.
A consistent estimates is yielded under the condition E(zisv˜it) = 0 with s ≤ (t − 1), that
is, we can use zit−1, zit−2, ... as instruments. Suppose we have a matrix of instruments, Zi,
satisfying the condition E(zisv˜it) = 0 with s ≤ (t−1), with Zi = [z′i1 · · · z′iT−1]; v˜i = [v˜i2 · · · v˜iT ]′.
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β˜2SLS = arg min[
n∑
i=1
Z ′iv˜i]
′(Z ′Z)−1[
n∑
i=1
Z ′iv˜i] = arg min v˜
′
iZ(Z
′Z)−1Z ′v˜i (14)
We have
β˜2SLS = (X˜
′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′X˜)−1X˜ ′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′y˜ = (X˜ ′PzX˜)−1X˜ ′Pz y˜, (15)
where Z = [Z1Z2...ZN ]
′, X˜ = [X˜1X˜2...X˜N ]′, and X˜i = [x˜i2x˜i3...x˜iT ]′. In fact, β˜2SLS is inefficient
GMM estimator.
B.1.2 GMM Estimation
We know that the instrumental variables Z are exogeneous and E(Ziv˜i) = 0. Hence, the L
instruments generate a set of L moments.
mi(β) = Z
′
iv˜i = Z
′
i(y˜i − X˜iβ), (16)
where mi is L×1. This L moment conditions will be satisfied at the true value of β: E(mi(β)) =
0. Given that we have N observations and T − 1 equations with cross equation restrictions,
i.e., the same β, each of L moment equations corresponds to a sample moment. For some give
estimator βˆ, we can write these L sample moments as
m¯N (βˆ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′i(y˜i − X˜iβˆ) =
1
N
Z ′v˜. (17)
The moment restrictions upon which we use a difference GMM estimation are E(Z ′iv˜i) = 0,
i = 1, 2, ..., N . The GMM estimators for β based on E(Z ′iv˜i) = 0 is
β˜ = arg min
β˜
m¯N (β˜)
′Wm¯N (β˜). (18)
Hence, we have arbitrary GMM estimator,
β˜ = (X˜ ′ZWZ ′X˜)−1X˜ ′ZWZ ′y˜. (19)
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This GMM estimator is consistent for any symmetric positive definite weighting matrix W . If
W = (Z ′Z)−1, then β˜ is the 2SLS estimates, but it may not be efficient.
In order to get the efficient GMM estimator, we need minimum asymptotic variance. We
know that we have the following T − 1 equations.
y˜i2 = x˜
′
i2β + v˜i2 (20)
y˜i3 = x˜
′
i3β + v˜i3 (21)
... (22)
y˜iT = x˜
′
iTβ + v˜iT (23)
Thus, given v˜i = [v˜i2, ...v˜iT ]
′, the instrument matrix is the following.
Zi =

Z ′i1 0 · · · 0
0 Z ′i2
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 Z ′iT−1

(24)
The minimization problem is that
βˆ2SGMM = arg min
βˆ
m¯N (βˆ)
′Vˆ −1m¯N (βˆ). (25)
Solving this problem gives
βˆGMM = (X˜
′ZVˆ −1Z ′X˜)−1X˜ ′ZVˆ −1Z ′y˜, (26)
where Z = [Z1Z2...ZN ]
′, and X˜ = [X˜1X˜2...X˜N ]′. The asymptotic covariance matrix of the
moment condition Vˆ is estimated by the following.
Vˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′i ˜˜vi ˜˜v
′
iZi, (27)
where ˜˜vi = y˜i− X˜iβ˜ p−→ y˜i− X˜iβ = v˜i, where β˜ = (X˜ ′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′X˜)−1X˜ ′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′y˜, which
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is estimated by the panel data 2SLS estimation.
B.2 CUE GMM Estimation
Hansen (1996) devised the GMM continuously updated estimator (CUE). The minimization
problem is that
βˆCUE = arg min
βˆ
m¯N (βˆ)
′Vˆ (βˆ)−1m¯N (βˆ), (28)
where the weighting matrix is a function of the β being estimated. That is, the estimation of
V is done simultaneously with the estimation of β and the minimization problem is solved by
numerical methods.
Notes
1For a static model, we can impose the strong exogeneity assumption, E(zisvit = 0), s, t = 1, 2, ..., T , that is
to say, past, present, and future values of the instrumental variables should be mean independent of v.
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